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Introduction: What Does Equality Mean to Nice White Parents? 
 
The School for International Studies (SIS) is an innovative public school in 
Brooklyn, New York. In 2015, most SIS students were drawn from poor or 
working-class Black, Latino, and Middle Eastern families. However, in the last few 
years, white parents with liberal values have begun sending their children to this 
school out of a well-intentioned rejection of the de facto segregation in the schools 
their children previously unattended. The recent New York Times podcast "Nice 
White Parents" picks up the story from there, detailing the controversies that 
emerged almost immediately.1 
 
In the very first episode of the podcast, one of the white fathers, Rob 
Hansen, grows frustrated with the inefficiencies of the PTA and its lack of 
fundraising prowess, and he decides to draw on his professional background and 
networks to create a foundation to solicit donor money. As it happens, Rob and 
several of the other white families want their kids to learn French (not, we gather, 
because of any ethnic ties to France), and they decide that the foundation should 
focus its fundraising specifically on building a French language program at the 
school. While this program is open to all students, the PTA is frustrated because 
they recognize it is an initiative explicitly catering to the desires of the white parents 
who want their children to have an advantage in college applications. In addition, 
many of the parents argue that the money being raised should go toward updating 
school infrastructure or other aims that more directly benefit everyone. 
 
I am guessing that regardless of what one thinks about SIS's situation, no 
one feels indifferent when hearing this story. But let me see if I can be more precise 
in my estimation at how the various reactions correlate with political views. Let's 
start with the assumption that, generally speaking, while the political Right 
(especially in its most libertarian forms) would likely argue that there is no problem 
at all, the political Left is united in seeing this as a problem. Let me further speculate 
that the Left is divided on what exactly the primary problem is and how best to 
address it.  
 
In contemporary explorations of equity, we can understand the Left’s 
framing of justice issues in terms of the late political theorist John Rawls’ 
foundational works on justice. In our post-Rawlsian context, the Left typically 
frames justice issues in terms of equality of opportunity or equality of outcome.2 
 
1 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/podcasts/nice-white-parents-serial.html 
2 Rawls is a compelling figure in my argument because he does not fit squarely within either 
conception. Indeed he furnishes explicit arguments against both conceptions - arguing that neither 
can fully overcome the issue of natural and social contingency. Nevertheless, his difference 
We might imagine the opportunity theorists identifying the school's problem as 
inequity as it pertains to which students access which material resources. Framed 
in this way, the obvious solution is to redistribute the money coming in from the 
foundation in a manner that more obviously benefits all the students equally. On 
the other hand, the outcome theorists say the problem is simply that some students 
gain an edge over the other students through the specialized French course, and the 
solution is thus to either continually increase the number of students taking French 
or to abolish the class altogether.   
 
I begin this essay on public policy considering this podcast because the 
issues at this school are a microcosm of today's most passionate debates, 
particularly within the Left. At risk of painting with too broad a brush, let's say that 
today's neoliberals focus on outcomes, advocating for affirmative action and quotas 
as a way of reassuring themselves that so long as a steady handful of intelligent 
students from underprivileged backgrounds are joining the ranks of the elite then 
justice is being served overall.3 On the other hand, social democrats (defined here 
as proponents of expansive social welfare within the broader capitalist structure) 
and socialists instead insist on better redistributions of material resources, 
particularly since they are focused less on racial barriers and more focused on class 
warfare.  
 
The crux of my argument in this paper requires a rejection of the idea that 
either framework, equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, serves as a good 
starting place for defining the problem central to the school or seeking to address 
that problem. And just as the case study opens into a larger consideration of public 
policy debates, my argument also takes a wide view of present affairs. I will argue 
that the primary problem facing the school and American society more broadly is 
the artificial narrowing of who constitutes the public and the exclusion of those who 
lack technocratic expertise from the democratic process. I will then argue for a 




The Critique of Neoliberal Meritocracy: 
 
To begin, let us leave the school for now, and think critically about the neoliberal 
opportunity theorists. These theorists are concerned primarily with consistent and 
 
principle articulated crudely as a rising tide lifting all boats is focused on outcomes and so I 
tentatively group him with the outcome theorists with plenty of important caveats. (See pgs. 71-
80.) 
3 More broadly, this view is focused on social mobility as the primary measure of progress.  
sufficient mobility as the metric for establishing equality.4 In this regard, these 
theorists adopt a variation of Rawls' difference principle inasmuch as it is 
understood by these theorists that a situation with both inequality and the accessible 
promise of mobility into a better life is preferable to an equality of situation wherein 
everyone's situation is of a decidedly lower quality of life.5 Nevertheless, Rawls 
parts ways with opportunity theorists in establishing as a further condition that the 
advantages drawn by those with greater success are justifiable only if the socially 
advantaged improve the quality of life of those not advantaged beyond what it 
would be if everyone had an equal situation. In other words, Rawls insists that the 
rising tide must lift all boats, while the opportunity theorists merely insist that there 
be steady mobility into the rising boats by those who are otherwise sinking.6 This 
careful distinction separates the ideal Rawlsian society from the meritocracy we 
currently inhabit, which Rawls severely critiques.   
 
Rawls positions meritocracy as a social order that "uses equality of 
opportunity as a way of releasing men's energies in the pursuit of economic 
prosperity and political dominion."7 In this order, "there exists a marked disparity 
between the upper and lower classes in both means of life and the rights and 
privileges of organizational authority."8 Ultimately, in such a system, "the culture 
of the poorer strata is impoverished while that of the governing and technocratic 
elite is securely based on the service of the national ends of power and wealth."9  
The crucial insight in all of this is that absent any corrective force, stark divides in 
outcomes will emerge which can threaten the preservation of the democratic state.  
 
It is important to note that Rawls' critique is emphatically not purely 
materialistic. Instead, in his critique of the sharp social division between the 
meritocratic winners and losers, he writes that the losers are justified in their revolt 
against the elites not simply because they were excluded from the wealth and 
privilege attached to the elites' roles, but more fundamentally "because they were 
disbarred from experiencing the realization of self which comes from a skillful and 
devoted exercise of social duties," a deprivation of "one of the main forms of human 
good."10 The point to underscore here is that for Rawls, this widening inequality in 
opportunity inhibits the full realization of a just society. 
 
 
4 After all, the alternative to this is a leveling of situations which ultimately represents the 
priorities of the outcome theorists. 
5 For the main discussion of Rawls’ difference principle, see pgs 75-83. 
6 See especially pg. 80 
7 Rawls, 106. 
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
10 Rawls, 84. 
While Rawls can get us started critiquing opportunity theorists and the 
meritocracy they produce, the late social theorist Christopher Lasch provides the 
visceral bite to this critique. Lasch has many indictments of the meritocratic elite. 
First, they tend to find success at the price of detaching from their community of 
origin: "from the professional and managerial point of view, neighborhoods are 
places in which the unenterprising are left behind - backwaters of failure and 
cultural stagnation."11 Similarly to Rawls, Lasch recognizes that this kind of 
geographic sorting "drains talent away from the lower classes and thus deprives 
them of effective leadership" (not to mention access to much-needed capital.)12 
Second, this new "aristocracy of brains," given its lack of rootedness, produces 
aristocrats who give their allegiance to the flow of capital in global markets, 
"turning their back on the heartland and cultivating ties with the international 
market in the fast-moving money, glamour, fashion, and popular culture."13 Third, 
in addition to being themselves unrooted, these elites actively participate in the 
uprooting of whatever city they happen to dwell in, remaking the city "as a place 
merely to work and play, not as a place to put down roots, to raise children, to live 
and die."14 Fourth, as a direct byproduct of this geographic concentration of the 
elites, positions of influence are also consolidated and have added barriers of entry 
as "the circles of power - finance, government, art, entertainment - overlap and 
become increasingly interchangeable."15 Fifth, and finally, the elites who have been 
taught that they are the deserving and valued members of society really do absorb 
this message and consequently learn to look down on everyone else: long before 
Hillary Clinton was dismissing half of America as a "basket of deplorables," Lasch 
was writing of the "the venomous hatred that lies not far beneath the smiling face 
of upper-middle-class benevolence."16 
 
Lasch's scathing portrait of the meritocratic elite is the necessary foundation 
for understanding his diagnosis of the patterns of disinvestment and disrepair that 
mark the places and people abandoned in the meritocratic social Darwinist system. 
Notice then that in the substantive and evergreen passage I quote below, most 
neoliberals can certainly affirm the crisis that Lasch identifies. Still, they rarely can 
see how they are implicated in it, and they certainly cannot conceive of any lasting 
solutions to it. Lasch writes:  
 
 
11 Lasch, 134. 
12 Ibid, 44. 
13 Ibid, 6. 
14 Ibid, 135. 
15 Ibid, 18. 
16 Ibid, 28. 
The same pattern of development has been repeated in one city after 
another, with the same discouraging results. The flight of population to the 
suburbs, followed by the flight of industry and jobs, has left our cities 
destitute. As the tax base shrivels, public services and civic amenities 
disappear. Attempts to revive the city by constructing convention centers 
and sports facilities designed to attract tourists merely heighten the contrast 
between wealth and poverty. The city becomes a bazaar, but the luxuries on 
display in its exclusive boutiques, hotels, and restaurants are beyond the 
reach of most of the residents.17 
 
As with Rawls, Lasch's objection to meritocracy is not merely materialistic. Instead, 
he too is concerned with the effects of meritocracy on the democratic ideal. For 
example, even in the description of the effects of neoliberal policy quoted above, 
Lasch is not concerned primarily with income disparity as much as he is concerned 
that the end product is the loss of civic participation as abandoned communities are 
drained of resources for civic life on the one hand, and elite cities are transformed 
into "a sprawling amorphous conglomeration without clearly identifiable 
boundaries, public space, or civic identity, "on the other.18 Similarly, Lasch is 
concerned with how the talent siphoning and power consolidation inherent to 
meritocracy undermine the democratic ideal of each citizen as an active participant 
in public affairs - together forming the public in public policy. It is again worth 
quoting Lasch at length on this point: 
 
Civic life requires settings in which people meet as equals, without regard 
to race, class, national origins. Thanks to the decay of civic institutions 
ranging from political parties to public parks and informal meeting places, 
conversation has become almost as specialized as the production of 
knowledge.19 
 
In this portion of his argument, Lasch levies what is perhaps the best critique 
of Rawls, namely that regardless of how deeply Rawls himself is allergic to 
meritocracy, the Rawlsian rational actor has no real reason to share this allergy 
given that he has no necessary social ties or obligations beyond the duty not to 
impede others in the pursuit of their own happiness. In Lasch's description, Rawls' 
liberalism "conceives of human beings as rootless abstractions wholly absorbed in 
maximizing their own advantage," and within that system, there is "no room for 
affective ties except in their most abstract form," (one loves humanity but not his 
 
17 Ibid, 8. 
18 Ibid, 9. 
19 Ibid, 117. 
neighbor.)20 Why should I, the Rawlsian actor, be forced to bump up against others 
in civic life in circumstances and settings not of my choosing and liking? And why 
should I share the bounties of my privilege as the difference principle bids me, with 
people with whom I have no ties? And indeed this is the exact view that Lasch finds 
explicitly advocated by Rawls' disciple Richard Rorty who writes in his own words 
of a civil society that looks like "a bazaar surrounded by lots and lots of exclusive 
private clubs," in which the only shared public forum is the marketplace, a society 
in which all other forms of engagement take place in the insularity of self-chosen 
enclaves.21  
 
Thus, for all Rawls' insights, his central flaw is not recognizing that his ideal 
mode of liberalism, if it is to avoid becoming a meritocracy, fully depends on pre-
liberal sources of political identity. But precisely because his project (and much of 
the neoliberal project) seeks to be self-sufficient without prescription of particular 
civic virtues, it cannot acknowledge its predicament. Thus to draw from the words 
of Lasch, "having abandoned the old republican ideal of citizenship along with the 
republican indictment of luxury," these opportunity theorists in the neoliberal mold 
lack "any grounds on which to appeal to individuals to subordinate private interest 
to the public good."22  
 
In short, the opportunity theorists' emphasis on mobility is myopic toward 
the widespread political and economic devastation wrought by meritocracy, and the 
neoliberal paradigm cannot exculpate itself from the pernicious consequences of 
meritocracy without admitting the insufficiencies of the Rawlsian position. When 
people are convinced that opportunity theory fails as a framework, they move 
quickly toward outcome theory. As we will see, this leads us directly to a ballooning 
administrative state that, however well it might lead to a more just distribution of 
resources (and this is of course arguable), merely exacerbates the political 
disenfranchisement of most citizens and further banishes much of the public from 
public policy.    
 
 
The Critique of Liberal Welfare and The Administrative State: 
 
 
20 Ibid, 103. 
21 Ibid, 128. 
22 Ibid, 95. We might inquire as to whether liberalism is merely dependent on preliberal sources or 
whether it is parasitic in its feeding upon the very preliberal sources that have hitherto sustained it 
as theorists like Patrick Deneen maintain. Without wading into that debate, let me simply note that 
we do have distinctly American ideals of civic republicanism, not least of which is Winthrop’s 
famous sermon A Model of Christian Charity which provided much of the theoretical foundation 
for Puritan civic life.  
Unlike market-infatuated neoliberals, progressives call for an increase in 
government services and social safety nets funded by increased government 
redistribution of wealth through higher taxes levied on the wealthy. However, when 
pressed, few progressives can furnish evidence that the growing inflation of 
government-as-administrative-state produces tangible results in reducing poverty 
or healing the divisions (economic and social) created by the market efficiencies of 
meritocracy. The progressives must instead argue that none of the previous four or 
five or ten presidential administrations were daring enough, that if only we expand 
government even more, then all the problems Lasch has outlined will finally be 
resolved.  
 
Lasch indicts the sliding goal posts that underpin this rhetoric, noting that 
"if the reform movement gave us a society that bears little resemblance to what was 
promised, we have to ask not whether the reform movement was insufficiently 
liberal and humanitarian but whether liberal humanitarianism provides the best 
recipe for a democratic society."23 In lieu of convincingly answering Lasch's 
indictment, progressives are left to simply beg the question ad nauseum. 
 
Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of argument that the progressives 
are right that an ever-expanding centralized administrative state is what is required 
as the precondition for equality of outcome as the basis for a just society. We still 
need to think about what effects such a state has on democracy and the public's role 
in public affairs. Recall from the previous section that even Rawls—for as much as 
he does not wish to prescribe any particular normative way of life—sees democratic 
participation as a constitutive element of a fulfilled life, and not simply as a 
mechanism for ensuring material benefit but more fundamentally as a pathway to 
self-realization.  
 
What is the effect of a growing administrative state on democratic 
participation? Lasch surveys the origins of administrative government in the 
reforms of 20th-century progressives like Woodrow Wilson who he sees as 
operating from the position that "government was a science, not an art."24 For these 
pioneers of government expansion, Lasch notes that public debate is a distraction 
from the work of experts whose specialized education ensures they understand 
policy questions better than the average Joe.25  
 
 
23 Lasch, 148. 
24 Ibid, 167. 
25 ibid. 
As the work of shaping policy is handed over to credentialed economists 
and other social scientists, the role of the public becomes focused on the procedural 
rather than the substantive, choosing the decision-makers rather than making 
decisions. Lasch notes that the public, in this case, ordinary citizens in their capacity 
as citizens, become increasingly "content to leave government to the experts," on 
the condition that the experts satisfy their appetite for the "ever-increasing 
abundance of comforts and conveniences so closely identified with the American 
way of life."26  Likewise, so long as their various metrics of success in equity and 
equality are met, opportunity and outcome theorists alike are content to let 
governance become the domain of an elite few.27    
 
Writing several decades before Lasch, Arendt anticipates his concerns while 
providing an even more extensive argument against the shift to technocracy. She, 
too, denounces as anti-democratic those modern bureaucratic states in which "all 
political questions in the welfare state are ultimately problems of administration, to 
be handled and decided by experts."28 She further notes that not even the "experts" 
in this framework are genuine political actors engaged in statecraft. She writes, for 
example, that elected representatives lack "an authentic area of action," and are 
mere "administrative officers, whose business, though in the public interest, is not 
essentially different from the business of private management."29 
 
Arendt also identifies the sleight-of-hand in which citizens are taught to be 
content with procedural participation rather than deliberative, active, and 
substantive participation. She notes that we are increasingly left in a situation in 
which people only share in public power at the ballot box on election day, with ever 
 
26 Ibid, 169. 
27 I should note as an aside that in Lasch’s view, The Right has no answer to this blossoming of 
the administrative state either. He writes bitingly that  “...we have heard a good deal of talk about 
the repair of our material infrastructure, but our cultural infrastructure needs attention too,” and he 
adds that this attention must be more than simply “the rhetorical attention of politicians who praise 
‘family values’ while pursuing economic policies that undermine them” (pg. 100.)  In typical 
rhetorical flourish, Lasch writes that “suburban shopping malls are no substitute for 
neighborhoods” and “market mechanisms will not repair the fabric of social trust.” Arendt shares 
in this critique, particularly focusing on the errors of market fundamentalists. She writes, “when 
were told that by freedom we understood free enterprise, we did very little to dispel this monstrous 
falsehood, and all too often we have acted as though we too believed that it was wealth and 
abundance which were at stake in the postwar conflict…” (209) She adds that economic growth 
can neither “lead into freedom or constitute a proof for its existence,” a fact readily made apparent 
when one considers present-day China. Put simply, for both thinkers, the only contribution the 
Right seems to have to the problems of the administrative state is the inane proposal that it be 
replaced with an even larger globalized market, leading us right back to the neoliberal conundrums 
from which we came. 
28 Arendt, 264. 
29 ibid. 
lessening "opportunity of being republicans and of acting as citizens."30 She writes 
gloomily that "the most the citizen can be hoped for is to be 'represented', whereby 
it is obvious that the only thing which can be represented and delegated is interest, 
or the welfare of the constituents, but neither their actions nor their opinions."31 
Indeed, it is worse than this, for while we might assume that citizens still retain 
their opinions, Arendt maintains that they in fact do not, because "opinions are 
formed in a process of open discussion and public debate," and where no such 
public discussion exists, there are only political moods.32 
 
Careful attention to this line argument should give a resounding answer to 
the question regularly raised by the various consultants and strategists relied upon 
by the DNC, particularly in the face of campaign defeats, "why do the masses vote 
against their own interest?" Because even leaving unaddressed the assumption that 
these strategists are in the best position to define public interest, it never seems to 
occur to them that maybe Joe the Plumber wants to participate meaningfully in 
defining political problems and crafting political solutions particularly in his local 
community, rather than being spoon-fed policy proposals he had no say in by a 
faraway elite he knows looks down on him.33 And to the extent that Joe and his 
neighbors are pushed out of this political work, they are naturally susceptible to the 
kinds of political moods that usher in demagogues that flatter them at exuberant 




A Better Model, Equality of Participation: 
 
Lasch puts matters bluntly: "democracy works best when men and women do things 
for themselves, with the help of their friends and neighbors, instead of depending 
on the state."34 By "works best," we are not talking about metrics like market 
efficiency, but rather the citizenry's political health.  
 
30 Ibid, 245. 
31 Arendt, 260. 
32 ibid. 
33 I have in mind strategists like David Schor who had this to say in a recent NY Magazine 
interview: “"if we can’t reduce the structural biases that have appeared in the last ten years by 
changing the rules of the game [eg., statehood for DC, etc.], we will have to make the hard choice 
of changing our party so that we can appeal to these non-college-educated voters who are turning 





34 Lasch, 7-8. 
 
This is not a particularly new insight. As Arendt notes, for the ancient 
Greeks who invented democracy, freedom was something understood as being 
manifest in human action, that "could appear and be real only when others saw 
them, judged them, remembered them."35 Thus she notes that, contrary to Rawls' 
vision of the sovereign individual who defines his own goods, "the life of a free 
man needed the presence of others."36 More specifically, she notes that "freedom 
itself needed...a place where people could come together - the agora, the market-
place, or the polis, the political space proper."37 
 
Arendt sees this understanding of freedom as central to America's founding. 
She writes that "Americans knew that public freedom consisted in having a share 
in public business and that the activities connected with this business by no means 
constituted a burden but gave those who discharged them in public a feeling of 
happiness they could acquire nowhere else."38 As with the Greeks, this early 
American conception of public freedom is significantly exterior and bound to space 
and time; public happiness is what we enjoy together to a large extent through our 
shared political deliberation and political action in public spaces.39  
 
Arendt's central insight is that, unlike the French revolution which was 
mostly fixated on disparities of wealth as the defining problem of the age, for the 
American Founders, "the problem they posed was not social but political, it 
concerned not the order of society but the form of government."40 Put another way, 
rather than a social revolution premised on social mobility, America began as a 
political revolution premised on political participation.41 
. 
 
35 Arendt, 21. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 Ibid, 110; on this, Arendt is in direct agreement with Rawls. 
39 This, on the other hand, is directly contrary to Rorty’s vision of freedom as what we enjoy in the 
privacy of our exclusive clubs. Sadly it is indeed Rorty’s vision of freedom that Arendt sees as 
defining America today, a view in which freedom must now be “defended against the public and 
its power,” and in where we now equate “the political with government” (128.) 
40 Ibid, 58 
41 The French position may seem, at first glance, the more compassionate, just as the progressives 
often assume they hold the moral high ground. But it is precisely the emphasis on political 
participation that leads Arendt to write so incisively that “the predicament of the poor after their 
self-preservation has been assured is that their lives are without consequence, and that they remain 
excluded from the light of the public realm where excellence can shine…” (59.) The French 
Revolution, much like our own meritocracy fails miserably when we extend our analysis beyond 
mere material standing. As Arendt writes, “the ‘elite sprung from the people’ has replaced the pre-
modern elites of birth and wealth; it has nowhere enabled the people qua the people to make their 
entrance into political life and to become participators in public affairs” (269.) 
To briefly summarize all that has been hereto argued, no matter how 
dutifully we facilitate upward mobility as the opportunity theorists demand or 
redistribute resources as the outcome theorists demand, we will never ensure a 
thriving democracy. Instead, in keeping with the insights of the Greeks and 
American Founders, our focus needs to be on equality of participation as our 
benchmark. In this framework, we will, as Lasch writes, "defend democracy not as 
the most efficient but as the most educational form of government," a form of 
political participation that "extends the circle of debate as widely as possible and 
thus forces all citizens to articulate their views, to put their views at risk, and to 




Conclusion: A Public Philosophy for the 21st Century 
 
We are now ready to return to the nice white parents at the SIS school. My argument 
all along has been that neither the opportunity nor the outcome theorists are of direct 
help in analyzing the situation. Drawing from the three figures cited in this paper, 
however, I hope we can now see that the primary problem with the foundation set 
up by Hansen is that it bifurcates the school community, narrowing the scope of 
"the public" involved in the public process of democratically governing the school 
(including the notable task of selecting courses). We ought, therefore, to be critical 
of this action even if full equality of opportunity and outcome were achieved 
exclusively, or achieved with greater efficiency, through this means. Rather than 
circumventing the public as it is constituted by participating parents, teachers, 
students, and other key members of the community, Hansen should seek to work 
within the community as a whole in discussion and collaboration with his fellow 
citizens as together they chart a trajectory for the school. 
 
Expanding outward, I have argued that neither the market nor the 
administrative state are adequate replacements for a politically engaged citizenry 
that deliberates together in public about public affairs and that acts together as an 
expression of public freedom. Let me turn one final time to Lasch: 
 
A public philosophy for the twenty-first century will have to give more 
weight to the community than to the right of private decision. It will have 
to emphasize responsibilities rather than rights. It will have to find a better 
expression of the community than the welfare state. It will have to limit the 
 
42 Lasch, 171. 
scope of the market and the power of corporations without replacing them 
with a centralized state bureaucracy."43  
 
At the heart of Lasch' call for a public philosophy is the concept of the public. The 
question of how we can restore the public to public policy is perhaps the greatest 
question facing us as policy practitioners today. And so while I’ve written this to a 
professional audience, I do not wish for this discourse to be contained within the 
boundaries of the credentialed discipline. It is time to engage the fullest imaginable 
public directly in the discussion of public affairs which equally concerns each of us 
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